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Abstract 
   Recently, the outstanding debt of the Japanese government amounts to 695 trillion yen, which implies 
139.5% of GDP. In this paper, we constructed three IS-LM type dynamic models and estimate the eigenvalues 
of their differential systems. Then we confirm whether or not the huge amount of public debt violates the 
stability conditions for the Japanese economy.   
   Our estimation concludes the Japanese economy to be unstable with the existence of a saddle-point 
equilibrium. Our simulation also shows that severe tax reform would be required to restore the economic 
stability. Concretely, the government has to raise the consumption tax rate to 15% from 5%, and in addition, 
allowing the income elasticities of income taxes and inhabitant taxes to increase by 0.033 each, which is 
equivalent to tax hikes of about 8.3 trillion yen. We assert that structural reform for the government budget 
including a tax system is essential and emergent. 
 
                                                         
 
1.  Introduction 
 
      The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of public debt on Japan’s macroeconomic 
stability. Recently, the sustainability of the Japanese government’s debt is widely perceived as a 
major issue because of its huge amount of 695 trillion yen, which implies 139.5% of GDP, at the end 
of fiscal year 2003. High interest rates raised by a recovery in private capital demand could 
possibly cause a spiral increase in public debt. For example, the yield on newly issued 10-year 
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government bonds jumped from 0.44% on the 22
nd of June to 1.67% about three months later, on 
the 2
nd o f  S e p t em b er  i n  20 0 3 .  I n  ot h er  w o rd s ,  i t  i s  q u e st i on a bl e  w h e t h e r  J ap a n  i s  a t  a  s t a b le 
equilibrium as defined by macroeconomics: In that case, there are no grounds for the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policy. 
      In this paper, we consider this issue by investigating the local stability conditions at the steady 
state theoretically and empirically. Assuming the existence of unemployment, we make use of the 
traditional IS-LM framework. To begin with, we take the “Fixed Capital Model” in Blinder-Solow 
(1973), which explicitly includes public debt, and generalize it in several directions, and then 
construct and estimate an empirical model consistent with this theory. Then we compute a 
coefficient matrix of a differential system of our model to confirm the stability conditions by using 
the estimated eigenvalues or the Routh-Hurwitz conditions. 
1) 
2) To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that explicitly estimates the coefficient matrix of the differential system. 
   The stability is classified as follows by the signs of the real part of the eigenvalues of the 
estimated coefficient matrix. First, the equilibrium state is characterized as “unstable” when the 
real parts of all eigenvalues are positive. In this case, an increase in public debt caused by any 
change in exogenous variables, such as policy variables, makes interest rates spiral, and then the 
economy diverges. Second, the equilibrium state is said to be “stable” when the real parts of all 
eigenvalues are negative. In this case, even if some shocks boost the public debt permanently, the 
incremental amount decreases gradually, which means that the economy converges to its new 
equilibrium. Finally, we can find a situation in which some parts are positive and the rest are 
negative; this is called the saddle-point equilibrium. This equilibrium state is also stable if 
economic agents are assumed to be rational and some of the variables are “jumpable”. However, it 
will be taken as unstable in this paper because we do not have any jumpable variables here. 
   This study is related to two research areas. First, although the stability conditions of the 
IS-LM type dynamic model should be tested empirically as is pointed out in Blinder-Solow (1973), 
Turnovsky (1977) and so on, no preceding literature exists at least regarding the Japanese economy. 
Second, as is mentioned in Blinder-Solow (1973), the stability conditions are sufficient conditions 
for the sustainability of the government budget, which means our study is also a test for the 
sustainability using the IS-LM type theory. Many analyses on the government budget 
sustainability have been executed since the oft-cited study of Hamilton-Flavin (1986); however, 
some variables such as the yield on bonds are taken as given in such literature. 
3) By contrast, our 
           
1)    As is well known, this means that we assume the existence of wealth effects of bonds, which Barro (1974) discussed 
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approach deals with these variables endogenously and should be regarded as complementary to 
the above-mentioned studies. 
4) 
   The numerical results of the present study are as follows. Our simulation concludes that the 
Japanese economy is unstable with the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium at the end of fiscal 
year 2002, the final year in our estimation. One of the reasons for the economic instability is the 
huge amount of public debt, as we have demonstrated. In our estimation, we must decrease the 
BOJ’s “Flow of Funds Accounts”-based net debt/GDP ratio from the actual value of about 104% to 
about 60% at the end of fiscal year 2002 to re-stabilize the economy because of a remarkable 
increase in the budget deficit derived from a slight rise in the yield on bonds. It is expected that 
this cumbersome situation would be revealed with economic recovery; therefore, reduction in 
public debt could be the emergent policy issue for Japan’s economic stability. 
5) 
      Our estimation shows that we need a tax reform to raise the consumption tax rate to 15% from 
5%, and in addition, allowing the income elasticities of income taxes and inhabitant taxes to 
increase by 0.033 each. This 0.033 rise in the income elasticities is equivalent to tax hikes of about 
8.3 trillion yen. Given that revenues from income taxes and inhabitant taxes totaled about 23 
trillion yen in fiscal year 2002, this tax reform must be severe. 
   The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, the benchmark model in 
Blinder-Solow (1973) is modified to fit our estimation using the macroeconomic data as the SNA. 
Then, two derivatives of this model are developed as dynamic variables are increased. In Section 3, 
macroeconometric models are constructed, and the local stability conditions are tested in each 
model. The policies that aim to restore the stability are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 is the 
summary of this study. 
 
2.    Theoretical Analysis on the Stability 
6) 
 
      In this section, we develop three theoretical models increasing the dynamic variables one at a 
time. This may seem redundant in view of the enormous amount of studies conducted over the 
decades; however, we believe it useful to clarify the relation between public debt and 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
           
4)  Hamilton-Flavin (1986) resolved the solution of the first-order differential equation (which means the government 
budget constraint), and then empirically analyzed its No-Ponzi game conditions, whereas we focus on its convergence 
conditions. 
5)    The Ministry of Finance declared its apprehension that rising interest rates might cause a further increase in public 
debt, due in part to the fact that interest on Japanese government bonds briefly exceeded 1.9% in June 2004. (June 17, 2004, 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun) 
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2–1.  Fixed  Capital  Model 
 
   In order to be consistent with our empirical analyses, the Fixed Capital model in 
Blinder-Solow (1973) (referred to as the original model below) is modified as follows. First, the 
original continuous model is changed into a discrete one. Second, “beginning of period” 
equilibrium in the original model is changed to “end of period” equilibrium. As Tobin (1980) 
stressed, the “end of period” equilibrium model is essential when using the “Flow of Funds 
Accounts” data. Finally, the bonds dealt with here are floating rate bonds with a fixed face value 
rather than perpetual bonds paying 1 unit of goods per period, which reflects that the data of the 
government’s interest payment is correlated to market interest rates. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the entire public debt is financed by government bonds, not by money creation. 
   Taking into account these three modifications and Turnovsky (1977), the original model is 
changed as follows: 
 
 
  t t t t t t t t G R I M B B R Y t C Y + + + + − = − − − − ) ( ) ), )( 1 (( 1 1 1 1  (1) 
  ) , , ( 1 1 − − + = t t t t t M B R Y l M  (2) 
  t t t t t tY G B R t B − + − + = − − 1 1) ) 1 ( 1 (  (3) 
   With no loss of generality, we can assume  1 = t P  and  M M M t t = = −1 . Notations are as 
in textbooks except for interest rate, t R , respectively. The most important change from the 
original model is that the interest rate becomes a dynamic variable. By using a linear 
approximation at the steady state, we can express a short-term equilibrium in reduced form 
assuming that wealth effects on private consumption surpass those on money demand. 
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Using these functions, we can obtain the dynamic system for this economy as follows: 
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Rewriting this differential system, it becomes: 
 
(＋)  (＋)  (－) 
(＋) (－) (＋)   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  53 
 





































tf B t tf R t
r
b
   (5) 
 
 Trace  =  ] 1 [ ] ) 1 [( − + − − R B g tf R t  
 Determinant  =  F ∆   =  ] ) 1 [( ] 1 ][ ) 1 [( R B R B tf B t g g tf R t − − − − − −  
 
   The necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of this system are Trace<0 and 
Determinant>0 (Routh-Hurwitz conditions). The steady state will be the saddle point with 
Trace<0 and Determinant<0, and unstable with Trace>0 and Determinant>0. However, the 
saddle-point equilibrium is not attainable because we do not have any jumpable variables here, so 
hereafter we consider this saddle-point equilibrium to be unstable in the following. 
7) 
   The  first  term  on  the  right-hand side in the trace definition implies the stability condition for 
the original model. New issues of bonds at time t( B ∆ ) raise both the government’s interest 
payment at time t+1( B R t ∆ − ) 1 ( ) and tax revenues by wealth effects ( B tfB∆ ). If the former 
surpasses the latter, the government has to issue new bonds at time t+1. However, if the amount is 
less than that at time t, which makes that at time t+2 much smaller, then the amount converges to 
0 as the time tends to infinity. Hence, in the original model with a non-dynamic interest rate, it is 
a necessary and sufficient condition that the first term is negative. 
   In the model developed here, however, the interest rate is dynamic. Therefore, that the first 
term is negative is not sufficient to create stability. It can be seen that the sign of the second term 
is ambiguous in general, but it is negative when the amount of an increase in the interest rate at 
time t+1 derived from that at time t – a high interest rate at time t gives high interest income, high 
consumption, and then a high interest rate at time t+1 – is lower than the latter. In this case, the 
trace is negative when the original stability condition is satisfied. 
      Next, let us consider whether the determinant condition can be satisfied. The first term on the 
right-hand side in the determinant is positive when both the first and the second term in the trace 
are negative. The second term in the determinant ( ] ) 1 [( R B tf B t g − − ) is also positive due to the 
signs of the short-term equilibrium equation (4). Thus, the sign of the determinant depends on 
which term surpasses the other. However, the determinant will be negative when there is a 
sufficient amount of issued bonds, since the effect of the second term overwhelms that of the first 
term. New issues of bonds at time t+1 in the present model are the sum of an amount of 
R B t ∆ − ) 1 (  and  B R t ∆ − ) 1 ( , the correspondence in the original model. Thus, when the amount 
of outstanding bonds is large, the economy diverges as the issuing of new bonds tends to infinity. 
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      It should be noticed that the [2,2] element of the coefficient matrix can be positive. In this case, 
the interest rate diverges because of a greater increase in interest rate at time t+1 than at time t. If 
this effect satisfies Trace>0 and Determinant>0, then the steady state is unstable since the amount 
of bonds tends to infinity due to this spiral increase in the interest rate. 
 
2–2.  Variable  Capital  Model 
 
      In this subsection, we extend the model to include private capital as in Blinder-Solow (1973) 
(Variable Capital Model). 
 
  t t t t t t t t t t G K R I K M B B R Y t C Y + + + + + − = − − − − − − ) , ( ) ), )( 1 (( 1 1 1 1 1 1  (6) 
 
  ) , , ( 1 1 1 − − − + + = t t t t t t K M B R Y l M  (7) 
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   For simplicity, we ignore capital depreciation and add two assumptions as shown below. 
When private capital increases, first, a decrease in private investment is assumed to surpass an 
increase in consumption through wealth effects ( 0 < + K W I C ), and second, the LM curve shifts 
more to the left than the IS curve does. 
8) Under these assumptions, we obtain the reduced forms, 
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8)    An increase in the private capital shifts both the IS curve and the LM curve; therefore, GDP decreases but the effect on 
interest rates is ambiguous. 
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・–Trace×(the sum of all 2×2 principal minors of the coefficient matrix)+ Determinant>0 
   Let us consider these conditions in comparison with the Fixed Capital model in Subsection 
II-1. An investment function of (6) and (9) with I K   <0, possibly derived from the stock 
adjustment principle, makes the [3,3] element in (11) negative. 
9) This means that the trace 
condition can be satisfied more easily than in the Fixed Capital model. The determinant is defined 
as 
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and it can be seen that the first term on the right-hand side in (12) besides  K I  is  equivalent to  
the determinant of the Fixed Capital model, ΔF. Hence, it is negative when the determinant 
condition in the Fixed Capital model is satisfied, and vice versa. The second term in (12) can be 
negative if an increase in interest payments ( B R t ∆ − ) 1 ( ) is less than that in tax revenues due to 
wealth effects ( B tfB∆ ), which implies that the determinant can be negative even when the first  
term is positive due to the debt outstanding. Therefore, the determinant condition can also be 
satisfied more easily than in the Fixed Capital model. 
      However, the third condition above is complex. Even under the assumptions that 
0 ] ) 1 [( < − − B tf R t , 0 ] 1 [ < − R g , 0 > ∆F and that the steady state in the Fixed Capital model 
is stable, 
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then, the sign of the determinant is ambiguous due to the third term on the right-hand side in (13). 
   The intuition is as follows. Suppose, in the Fixed Capital model, that new bonds are issued 
when its stability conditions are satisfied. The economy tends to its new steady state as both the 
bonds and the interest rate increase. In the absence of the one possibility that we will discuss soon, 
it is also true in the Variable Capital model since the private capital works as a “cushion” to 
suppress the upward pressure of the interest rate. The exception that makes the economy diverge 
in the Variable Capital model is when the interest rate has a strong effect on private investment. In 
this case, tax revenues decrease since the increasing interest rate reduces private investment and 
GDP, so that the amount of issued bonds cannot converge. Therefore, the steady state cannot be 
stable in this case. 
 
2–3.  Price  Adjustment  Model 
 
      In the previous subsections, economic stability is attained mainly through the increase in tax 
revenues derived from the wealth effects of public bonds. However, the stability conditions will 
change in the case of introducing price adjustment that can absorb an increase in GDP through 
wealth effects. In this subsection, we consider the price level as the fourth dynamic variable using 
the Phillips Curve and Okun’s Law. 
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    ) ( 1 − t K F in (18) is a production function, so (18) implies that the inflation rate is determined 
by the gap between actual and potential GDP. 
10) The expectation of the price level (
e
t P 1 + ) is 
assumed to be perfectly foresighted. In addition to the assumptions in the previous subsections, 
and assuming a greater shift in the LM curve than in the IS curve when the price rises, we obtain 
the short-term equilibrium equations below. 
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   With no loss of generality, we can set the initial price level equal to unity. By using a linear 
approximation at the steady state, the dynamics for this model are represented in the following 
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      As before, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability are that the real parts of 
all eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix are negative. Although we would like to consider the 
stability as we did in the previous two subsections, it is quite difficult to do so in this extended 
model. 
11) However, since what we would like to demonstrate is that the stability conditions here 
differ from those in the previous subsections, it is enough to explain that an unstable steady state 
possibly exists in this model when the stability conditions for the Variable Capital model are 
satisfied. 
   Suppose new bonds are issued in the Variable Capital model and its stability conditions are 
satisfied. The economy converges to its new steady state as both the bonds and the interest rate 
increase and as private capital decreases. Since the stability conditions are satisfied here, the 
increase in bonds raises tax revenues through wealth effects that are greater than interest 
payments. If the price level is introduced, however, the story changes because the increase in tax 
revenues depends on the increase in GDP. The growth of GDP raises the price level as well, which 
shrinks the growth of GDP itself. If this effect is large, the tax increase cannot cover the interest 
payments, and the amount of debt may diverge. 
      As shown in this section, the stability conditions differ among the models used. Even though it 
is possible to confirm the stability in one model, it does not necessarily hold true for another. In 
           
10)    We consider constant labor supply for potential GDP, but do not deal with it explicitly. 
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other words, even when the data of public debt seems to diverge, other dynamic variables can 
work to make the economy converge. 
   As mentioned in the previous section, policies based on the macroeconomic theories do not 
work when the steady state is unstable. Therefore, checking the stability conditions for the 
Japanese economy is quite important not only for academic interests but also for practical policy 
debates. In the next section, we compute the conditions and check whether or not they are 
satisfied in the Japanese economy. 
 
3.    Empirical Analysis of the Stability Conditions 
 
      In this section, we estimate the local stability conditions for the Japanese macroeconomy and 
verify whether or not it is satisfied. Our methodology is as follows. First, we estimate a 
macroeconometric model consistent with our theoretical analyses. Next, for each of our three 
theoretical models, we compute the coefficient matrix of a differential system on the basis of the 
estimated parameters. Then we calculate the trace, the determinant and so on, and check the 
Routh-Hurwitz conditions. At the same time, we can obtain the eigenvalues of the coefficient 
matrix as solutions of the characteristic equations so that we also investigate the stability 
conditions by checking the signs of the real part of the eigenvalues. 
 
3-1.    Relation to Previous Literature 
 
      If the outstanding public debt is less than the amount that violates the stability conditions in 
macroeconomics, sustainable fiscal management is possible. In this sense, our empirical analysis is 
related to the literature on sustainability tests of the Japanese government’s debts. Ihori, Nakazato 
and Kawade (2003) tested the fiscal sustainability of Japan’s central and local governments using 
the methodology of Hamilton and Flavin (1986). Ihori, Doi and Kondo (2001) employed the 
approach suggested by Bohn (1998) and tested the sustainability of the General Account of the 
national government. These researches presented some empirical results that gave us a negative 
prospects for fiscal sustainability of the Japanese government. Both Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
and Bohn (1998), however, deal with some variables such as the yield on bonds as exogenous. By 
contrast, our approach is based on the IS-LM type macro model and we handle the aggregate 
demand and the yield on bonds endogenously, making it possible to take into account the 
interdependence between these variables and the government’s debts. 
 
3-2.  The  Macroeconometric  Model 
 
   Data for the goods and services markets are mainly obtained from the “Annual Report on 
National Accounts” (from fiscal year 1980 to 2002), compiled by the Economic and Social Research   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  59 
 
Institute (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan). The financial asset market data is obtained from 
the “Financial and Economic Statistics (from fiscal year 1980 to 2002)” and “Flow of Funds 
Accounts (from fiscal year 1989 to 2002)”, compiled by the Bank of Japan. All the macro data is 
based on 93SNA and the data frequency is annual. Under the restriction of an small sample, we 
simply employ OLS to estimate each behavioral equation. 
12) 
   We constructed the macroeconometric model on the basis of the Price Adjustment model 
introduced in Section 2-3. However, we added a considerable number of structural equations to 
the original theoretical model to enhance goodness of fit for the actual Japanese economy. Figure 1 
shows an outline of our macroeconometric model. (See the appendix for all the structural 
equations and details of the data.) The major modifications are as follows: 
 1)  The private sector is divided into households and firms in the goods markets. 
  2) The government sector is divided into central and local government. This means that we 
separate the budget balance or the outstanding debts between the central and the local first, and 
then we reconstruct “government debt” as the total of them. 
  3) Tax revenues of the government are classified by tax items: income tax (included in the 
national tax), inhabitant tax on individuals (included in the local tax), corporate tax revenue 
(included in the national tax) and inhabitant tax on corporations (included in the national tax). In 
addition, we estimate the elasticity with respect to the corresponding income (or profits), instead 
of the marginal/average tax rate used in the theoretical models. 
4) The government bonds market represents financial asset markets in the econometric model, 
while the theoretical model employs the money market. 
 
   In our macroeconometric model, the structure of the actual Japanese financial markets is simplified as 
follows. First, the balance sheets of the private financial institutions are consolidated into that of the private 
non-financial sector. That is, we treat the portfolio selection of the private financial institutions exactly the same 
as that of the depositors or the insured for them. 
13) Second, the funding transactions between the private 
non-financial sector and the private financial institutions are offset by consolidating their balance sheets. Then, 
private financial instruments (bank loan, industrial debenture, etc.) are not explicitly considered in this model. 
Third, we treat postal savings and postal life insurance as an independent financial asset since, at present, the 
funds of public financial sectors are not completely operated in accordance with the market mechanism. 
14)  
           
12)    The sample size available is quite small because of insufficient retroaction of 93SNA in Japan. This restriction makes 
the two-stage least squares estimator or the three-stage least squares estimator unreliable. Therefore, we simply employ 
OLS, although we recognize the problem of the simultaneous-equations bias. 
13)    Actually, a private non-financial sector has only about 3% of the national bonds outstanding, while the private 
financial institutions own about 36% (at the end of fiscal year 2003). However, the private financial institutions demand 
deposits or life insurance mainly from the private non-financial sector. Then the private non-financial sector can be 
regarded as the ultimate holder of the government bonds held by the private financial institutions. 
14)    The funds of postal savings and postal life insurance should be invested in safer assets because they are protected by 
government guarantee. They mainly purchase national and local government bonds. For example, their share in relation to 















































































1）We  regard       as  a  behavioral  equation,       as  an  identity  and       as  an  exogenous  variable. 
2) In the actual macroeconometric model, budget balance (furthermore, outstanding debt) of the central government and the local 
government is separated once, and then we define “government debt” as the total of them. 
3) The funding transactions between the non-financial sector and the private financial institutions are offset by consolidating their 
balance sheets. Then, private financial instruments (bank loans, industrial debentures, etc.) are not explicitly considered in this 
model. 
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So, we separate the balance sheets for them from those of the private sector. We assume that the 
amount of postal savings and postal life insurance deposited by the private non-financial sector is 
given. In addition, we also deal with the asset portfolio of the public financial sector as exogenous. 
Fourth, financial transactions with foreign countries are omitted. 
   By applying these simplifications, only three assets remain to be considered: money, 
government debts and postal financial services (postal savings and postal life insurance). However, 
because we are assuming the supply of postal financial services as exogenous, it is only the money 
market and the government bonds market that must be treated endogenously, which is consistent 
with our theoretical framework. 
   Now we add one more assumption regarding the government bond market. In Japan, the 
J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  b o n d  ( J G B )  m a r k e t  i s  o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  m a r k e t  f o r  l o c a l  
government bonds. Besides, the rate of return on local government bonds is determined in 
accordance with that on JGBs. We therefore suppose that the government debt market (shown in 
the lowest part of Figure 1) is represented by the JGB market in our macro econometric model. 
      To affirm the forecast performance of our macroeconometric model, we executed a simulation 
within the sample period of fiscal year 1998–2002. Table 1 presents the calculated Theil’s U 
statistics for some of the important endogenous variables. 
15) 
 
Table 1. Calculated Theil’s U statistics of major endogenous variables 
: In the case of simulation within the sample period FY1998–2002 
 Theil's  U 
Real gross domestic product (as aggregate demand)  0.006 
Real private consumption  0.005 
Real investment    0.026 
Real capital stock  0.003 
Nominal gross domestic product  0.006 
GDP deflator (1 period ahead)  0.014 
Nominal tax revenue of the central government  0.012 
Nominal tax revenue of the local government  0.016 
Real yields on Japanese government bonds  0.015 
Fiscal deficit / Nominal GDP ratio of the central government  0.041 
Fiscal deficit / Nominal GDP ratio of the local government  0.095 
Nominal outstanding public debt  ※  0.012 
※  Net outstanding public debt: The sum of the net financial liability of the central and 
local governments (based on 93SNA). 
Net financial liability is calculated by subtracting the gross financial assets from the 
gross financial liabilities. 
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   On the whole, the forecast accuracy of our macro model is high, although Theil's U statistics 
with respect to the deficit/GDP ratio of both the central and the local government is slightly large. 
Therefore we consider it legitimate to use this macroeconometric model for our estimation of the 
coefficient matrix. 
 
3–3.    Estimating the Coefficient Matrix: Basic Methodology 
 
      The methodology of estimating the coefficient matrix of the dynamic system is as follows. For 
example, we illustrate the two-variable dynamic system. 
 


















































  where,  B B b t t − = R R r t t − =  (21) 
 
   First, we solve the macroeconometric model for the period of fiscal year 2002 without any 
restriction. Then, we obtain the solutions for the net public debt and the yield on government 





   Second, we assume the situation in which an increase of 1000 units of the net public debt 
occurs in fiscal year 2001 while the yield on government bonds does not change (bt-1 = 1000, rt-1 = 
0). Under this situation, we solve the macroeconometric model again for the period of fiscal year 
2002 and then obtain the new solutions for the net public debt and the yield on government bonds 
(~ B,~ R). 




R) and (~ B,~ R) into (21), we can estimate both the [1,1] element (α) and the 
[2,1] element (γ) of the coefficient matrix. 
  1000 1000 )
~
( 1 × = − − = − − α B B b b t t t   ⇒    ( ) 1000 1000
~
− − = B Bt α  
  1000 0 ) ~ ( 1 × = − − = − − γ r r r r t t t   ⇒    ( ) 1000 ~ r rt − = γ  
 
      Next, we assume the new situation in which a rise of 1 units in the yield on government bonds 
occurs in fiscal year 2001 while the net outstanding public debt does not change (bt-1 = 0, rt-1 = 1 
basis point). Under this new situation, we solve the macroeconometric model again for the period 









R) into (21), and calculate the [1,2] element 
(β) and [2,2] element (δ) of the coefficient matrix as shown below. 
  B Bt − = β   ,  1 − − = r rt δ  
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   By repeatedly using this methodology, we estimate the coefficient matrix of the dynamic 
system with three or four dynamic variables. 
 
3–4.    The Stability Conditions of the Fixed Capital Model 
 
      The dynamic system of the Fixed Capital model shown in Section 2-2 is as follows: 
 


























































   T h e  l e f t -hand side of the equation is the difference between the current and the previous 
fluctuation of the dynamic variable concerned. In this regard, the sign of the corresponding 
diagonal element indicates the dynamic stability of its own variable when we disregard the 
interaction with another dynamic variable. 
   If the sign is a minus, the current fluctuation of the dynamic variable concerned always falls 
below that in the previous period and this dynamic variable is in the process of converging to the 
steady state. However, when the dynamics are described as a simultaneous equations system, the 
dynamics of one variable are influenced by those of the other variables. For that reason, the 
variable concerned does not always converge only by the fact that the sign of a corresponding 
diagonal element is negative. The off-diagonal element of the coefficient matrix indicates the 
magnitude of the interaction between dynamic variables. 
      In this empirical analysis, we totaled the real net financial liability of the central and the local 
government from the “Flow of Funds Account” (based on 93SNA) and regard this total value as the 
real net outstanding public debt. 
16) And, we use the real interest rate of the Japanese government 
10-year bonds as the yield on government bonds. Equation (22) shows the estimated coefficient 
matrix of the dynamic system (5´). 
17) 
 


























84 . 0 0057 . 0










* The unit of b (fluctuation of real net outstanding public debt) is billion yen, while the unit of r 
(shift in the yield on bonds) is 1 basis point (0.01%). 
 
 
           
16)    Net financial liability is calculated by subtracting the gross financial assets from the gross financial liabilities. 
17)    This macroeconometric model was constructed corresponding to the Price Adjustment model. Then the private capital 
and the price level are viewed as exogenous variables if we use this model as the Fixed Capital model. Similarly, when we 
use this model as the Variable Capital model, we execute the simulation handling the price level as an exogenous variable. 64  K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review 
 
   Here, we examine the estimated coefficient of the diagonal elements. The estimated value of 
the [1,1] element is -0.1, which implies that an increase in the tax revenue slightly exceeds an 
increase in the interest payment burden. Therefore, as long as we disregard the influence from 
fluctuation of the yield on government bonds, the real net outstanding public debt gradually 
converges to a steady state. On the other hand, the estimated value of the [2,2] element is -0.84. 
That is, if the yield on government bonds in the previous period rose by 1 basis point, the yield on 
current government bonds also rises, but the increment is 0.84 basis points smaller than that in the 
previous period. Therefore, the yield on government bonds converges as long as we disregard its 
dynamic interaction with the real net outstanding public debt. 
   Next, we examine the estimated coefficient values of the off-diagonal elements. The [1,2] 
element of the coefficient matrix shows the amount of fluctuation of the real net outstanding 
public debt for this period when the yield on government bonds in the previous period rose by 1 
basis point. The estimated value is 25.8, and an increase in the interest payment burden greatly 
exceeds an increase in the tax revenue by the wealth effects. On the other hand, the [2,1] element 
shows the increment of the yield on government bonds for this period when the net outstanding 
public debt in the previous period increased by one unit (billion yen). In the IS-LM system, the 
yield on government bonds rises when the wealth effects work. The estimated value of this 
coefficient is 0.0057. Thus, in the dynamic system estimated as (22), there exists the interaction 
from which the stability of dynamic variables is mutually ruined. 
   T h e   R o u t h -Hurwitz conditions of the coefficient matrix were calculated as follows: 
  T r a c e       = –0.10 –0.84 = –0.94 < 0 
 Determinant  = –0.10 × (–0.84)–25.8 ×0.0057 = –0.06 < 0 
      The determinant does not satisfy the stability conditions, whereas the trace does satisfy them. 
Therefore, when considering the Japanese macroeconomy at the end of fiscal year 2002 to be in a 
state of stationary equilibrium, these values do not satisfy the local stability. We can also confirm 
the local stability conditions from the signs of the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix. When the 
real part of each obtained eigenvalue takes a negative value, the local stability of stationary 
equilibrium is secured. The obtained eigenvalues are -1.00 and 0.06; then the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of the local stability are still not satisfied. 
   To obtain an intuitive understanding, we executed simple simulation using (22) only in the 
case where the net outstanding public debt at the end of the preceding period increases by 1000 
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Table 2. Fluctuation of dynamic variables of the Fixed Capital model   
  Fluctuation of dynamic variables 
  Net outstanding public debt 
(Real, trillion yen) 
Yield of Japanese government bonds 
(Real, basis points) 
Initial value  1.00  0.0 
1
st period  0.90  5.7 
2
nd period  0.96  6.1 
3
rd period  1.02  6.5 
4
th period  1.08  6.9 
5
th period  1.15  7.3 
6
th period  1.23  7.8 
 
      When the net public debt in the previous period increases by one trillion yen, the net increase 
of the net public debt in the 1st period remains at 900 billion yen. At the same time, however, the 
yield on government bonds rises by 5.7 basis points. As a result, the public debt newly increases to 
960 billion yen in the 2nd period and the yield on government bonds rises more than the previous 
period by 6.1 basis points. After the 2nd period, the gains of the net outstanding public debt and 
the yield on government bonds always exceed those of the previous period. This is because the rise 
of the yield on government bonds expands the interest payment, causing further flotation of the 
government bonds. Hence, the net outstanding public debt and the yield on government bonds 
increase (rise) divergently. 
   The main factor in the collapse of the local stability conditions is in the [1,2] element of the 
coefficient matrix. When the amount of public debt is already large enough, the interest payment 
burden increases by a slight rise in the yield on government bonds. The net outstanding public 
debt diverges from the stationary state as a consequence and an increase in flotation of government 
bonds causes the yield on government bonds to rise further. 
 
3–5.    The Stability Conditions of the Variable Capital Model 
 
      The actual macroeconomy is not as simple as that described with the Fixed Capital model. In 
this subsection, we test the local stability of the Japanese macroeconomy using the Variable 
Capital model that includes real private capital as a dynamic variable. We estimated the dynamic 
system expressed in equation (11) on the basis of our macroeconometric model, and the result is as 
follows: 
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* The unit of b (fluctuation of the real net outstanding public debt) and k (fluctuation of the real 
private capital) is billion yen, while the unit of r (shift in the yield on bonds) is 1 basis point 
(0.01%). 
 
      The 2×2 principal submatrix is almost the same as the coefficient matrix of the Fixed Capital 
model; therefore, we focus only on the other elements here. The estimated value of the [3,3] 
element (-0.04) shows the stock adjustment speed of real private capital, and the [3,1] and [3,2] 
elements indicate the impact on real private capital for this period caused by fluctuation of a 
corresponding dynamic variable in the previous period. According to the estimated value of the 
[3,1] element, an increase of one unit in the net public debt in the previous period decreases real 
private capital by 0.17 units through the rise in interest rate. On the other hand, the estimated 
value of the [3,2] element (-26.1) is the decrement of private investment caused by a rise of one 
basis point in the interest rate in the previous period. These two negative elements imply that 
private capital decreases when the net public debt and/or the yield on government bonds 
increases.  
      The [1,3] and [2,3] elements show the influence that the dynamics of private capital exerts on 
the net public debt and the yield on government bonds. If private capital increases in the previous 
period, current private investment decreases because of the stock adjustment principle. Since this 
decreases the aggregate demand, tax revenues also decrease. The estimated value of the [1,3] 
element (0.01) shows a change in flotation of government bonds in accordance with such a 
decrease in tax revenues. And, the estimated value of the [2,3] element indicates that the yield on 
government bonds rises by 0.0001 basis points through an increase of one unit in private capital in 
the previous period. Of course, this influence acts in the reverse direction when private capital 
decreases in the previous period. Considering the effects of these off-diagonal elements, it seems 
that the dynamics of private capital has improved the stability of the net public debt. 
   T h e   R o u t h -Hurwitz conditions of the coefficient matrix were calculated as follows: 
 
    T r a c e   = –0.981 <0 
    D e t e r m i n a n t   = –0.0006    <0 
    –Trace×(the sum of all 2×2 principal minors of the coefficient matrix)+ Determinant =–0.018 
  cf. The eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix    (1.00, 0.01±0.03i) 
 
   Only the conditions of the trace and the determinant are satisfied from among the three   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  67 
 
necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the local stability. Similarly, the real parts of all 
eigenvalues are not negative, so the local stability of the Japanese macroeconomy is not secured. 
   As in the case of the Fixed Capital model, we executed simple simulation using (23). We 
assumed the case in which the net outstanding public debt at the end of the preceding period 
increases by 1000 units (1 trillion yen) while the yield on government bonds and the real private 
capital in the previous period did not change. Table 3 presents the simulation results. 
 
Table 3. Fluctuation of dynamic variables of the Variable Capital model 
  Fluctuation of dynamic variables 
 
Net outstanding public debt 
(Real, trillion yen) 
Yield of Japanese   
government bonds 
(Real, basis points) 
Private capital stock 
(Real, trillion yen) 
Initial value  1.00  0.0  0.0 
1
st period  0.90  5.7  -0.17 
2
nd period  0.95  6.1  -0.46 
3
rd period  1.01  6.4  -0.76 
4
th period  1.07  6.7  -1.06 
5
th period  1.12  7.1  -1.37 
6
th period  1.18  7.4  -1.69 
 
   Certainly, the amount of both the fluctuation of the net public debt and the yield on 
government bonds is smaller than that in the case of the Fixed Capital model shown in Table 2. 
However, the results here are the same as in the Fixed Capital model, to the extent that the 
fluctuations of dynamic variables increase as time passes. The Japanese macroeconomy diverges 
even under the Variable Capital model when judging from this result. Accordingly, although the 
dynamics of private capital slightly suppresses the macroeconomic divergence, this effect is not as 
large as the local stability is recovered. In other words, the interest payment burden of a large sum 
of government bonds makes the Japanese macroeconomy unstable even in the Variable Capital 
model. 
 
3–6.    The Stability Conditions of the Price Adjustment Model 
 
   In the Fixed Capital and Variable Capital models, it was assumed that the price level was 
i n v a r i a b l e .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  t a k e  m o r e  o f  a  m i d / l o n g -term view. Concretely, we take price 
variation into consideration, and then affirm the dynamic stability of the Japanese macroeconomy. 
The estimated coefficient matrix of the dynamic system with respect to the Price Adjustment 
model shown in (20) is as follows: 68  K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review 
 










































































1 0022 . 0 00000005 . 0 00003 . 0 0000002 . 0
9 . 2684 04 . 0 0 . 26 17 . 0
2 . 10 0001 . 0 84 . 0 0057 . 0
9 . 2482 009 . 0 8 . 23 10 . 0
 (24) 
* The unit of bN (fluctuation of the nominal net outstanding public debt) and k (fluctuation of the real 
private capital) is billion yen, while the unit of r (shift in the yield on bonds) is 1 basis point (0.01%). 
And, the unit of p (fluctuation of the price level) is 0.01 when the price level in 1995 is standardized to 
be unity. 
 
    The net public debt has been changed to nominal value based, so that we may consider the price 
level to be an endogenous variable in the Price Adjustment model. However, the estimated 
coefficients of the 3×3 principal submatrix are almost the same as those of the coefficient matrix in 
the Variable Capital model. Therefore, we will focus on the other elements of the matrix in the 
following.  
      It can be seen from the signs of the off-diagonal elements in the fourth row that an increase in 
the net public debt, a rise of the yield on government bonds, and a decrease in private capital are all 
factors of inflation. On the other hand, the estimated [1,4] and [2,4] elements are negative. Hence, 
the net public debt decreases and the yield on government bonds falls when the price level goes up, 
because tax revenues increase as nominal GDP increases. If these effects are sufficiently large, the 
dynamics of the net public debt and the yield on government bonds become stable as a result of 
fluctuations in price. The estimated value of the [3,4] element is negative, which means that the 
inflation of prices decreases the private capital divergently. In addition, the estimated value of the 
[4,4] diagonal element shows that the present inflation (or deflation) raises (lowers) the price 
level further in the succeeding periods. 
18) If these influences are large, the dynamics of private 
capital and the price level become unstable as a result of fluctuations in price. We confirmed 
whether or not the necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the local stability were satisfied, 
by checking the sign of the real part of each eigenvalue of the coefficient matrix in (24). 
19) The set 
of calculated eigenvalues are (λ1=  –0.99,  λ2  =  –0.03,  λ3,  λ4  = 0.02±0.05i); then the 
necessary and sufficient conditions were still not satisfied. 
 
4.    Policies to Restore Macroeconomic Stability 
 
      In the previous section, we obtained the result that the steady state is locally unstable in each 
           
18)    The sign of the estimated [4, 4] diagonal element is thought to reflect the so-called “deflation spiral” that the Japanese 
economy has experienced since the 1990s. 
19)    We only checked the signs of the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix, because the expression of the 4×4 matrix 
version of the Routh-Hurwitz condition is very complex.   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  69 
 
model, mainly because of a huge amount of issued public bonds. In this case, a slight rise in interest 
rates boosts interest payments, which causes the government to issue additional bonds so that the 
outstanding amount diverges. At the same time, market interest rates rise divergently and private 
capital is crowded out, then the economy diverges completely. In this section, we consider 
stability-restoring policies to avoid this catastrophe 
      To begin with, we compute the level of net outstanding public debt that can be maintained in 
the current economic situation in Japan using the Price Adjustment model. The terms of the 
current economy are defined such that 1) structural parameters of the economy are equal to the 
estimated parameters and they are invariable, and 2) all exogenous variables of the economy are 
evaluated at the fiscal year 2002 level. 
   In our model, interest on public debt at time t-1 is paid at time t by the government, so it is 
public debt in fiscal year 2001 that affects the economy in fiscal year 2002. As previously 
mentioned, the BOJ’s “Flow of Funds Accounts”-based net debt / GDP ratio is about 104% at the 
end of fiscal year 2002. (The gross debt / GDP ratio is about 146%.) In the following, we suppose 
that the ratio in fiscal year 2001 is equal to 100% at first and confirm the stability using the same 
method as in the previous section. If the stability conditions are not satisfied, we reduce the ratio 
by 5% and check it again. Repeating this procedure until the condition is fulfilled, we obtain the 
level of public debt that allows for a stable Japanese economy. 
   The purpose here is only to estimate the level numerically, so we assume that the initial 
reduction in the net public debt is absorbed by the Bank of Japan. In addition, it is assumed that a 
change in public debt derived by dynamic mechanism is purchased by the private sector. The 
results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The level of net public debt needed to satisfy the stability conditions: Tax rates and government 
spending fixed 
Outstanding amount of 
nominal net public debt 





100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 
-0.992 -0.988  -0.993  -0.989 -0.994 -0.999 -0.995 -1.000  -0.996  -1.001 
-0.032 -0.031  -0.031  -0.030 -0.030 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028  -0.027  -0.026 






















Number of eigenvalues 
with a negative real part 
2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  4/4 
Satisfaction of the 
stability conditions 
×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ○ 
Satisfaction of the stability conditions:  “○” if  satisfied, “×” otherwise. 70  K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review 
 
      Assuming that government spending is fixed at the fiscal year 2002 level, a level of only 60% of 
the net public debt / GDP ratio could be accepted for the stability. 
20) However, the assumption 
that the Bank of Japan absorbs such amount of public debt is not realistic. Considering that social 
security expenditures must increase due to aging, a reduction in government expenditures would 
be difficult as well. Hereafter, we compute the level of public debt that could restore the stability 
by a tax increase only. 
   First, we supposed a raise in consumption tax rate to 10% from 5%. Then, we continued to 
reduce the net public debt / GDP ratio by decrements of 5% until the conditions were satisfied. 
21) 
The results are summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The level of public debt needed to satisfy the stability conditions: In the case of 10% consumption tax 
rate  
Outstanding amount of 
nominal net public debt   
(March 31, 2002; 




100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 
-0.997  -0.993  -0.998  -0.994  -0.999  -0.995  -1.000 
-0.031  -0.030  -0.030  -0.028  -0.029  -0.028  -0.026 
Eigenvalues of   















The number of eigenvalues   
with a negative real part 
2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  4/4 
Satisfaction of the stability 
conditions 
×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ○ 
Satisfaction of the stability conditions: “○” if satisfied, “×” otherwise. 
 
   Even in the case of the 10% consumption tax rate, we need to decrease the net public debt / 
GDP ratio to 75% or less to restore the stability. This means that a 5% rise in the consumption tax 
is not sufficient to absorb the current interest payments. Hence, we perform the same simulation 
under the 15% consumption tax, the results of which are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
           
20)    When we reduced the ratio of the net outstanding public debt to nominal GDP from 65% in 1% decrements, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of the local stability were satisfied at 63%. 
21)    When we estimate the coefficient matrix of the differential system using the methodology introduced in Section 3-3, 
we are assuming an economy in which the consumption tax rate is always 10%. That is, we are not deriving the coefficient 
matrix from a comparison of the state before and after the hike in the consumption tax rate. What we want to analyze is 
not the temporary impact of the tax increase but the permanent effects in the steady state.   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  71 
 
Table 6. The level of public debt needed to satisfy the stability conditions: In the case of 15% consumption tax 
rate 
Outstanding amount of 
nominal net public debt   
(March 31, 2002; 
Ratio to nominal GDP) 
Actual value
(104%) 
100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 
-0.993  -0.999  -0.995  -1.000  -1.005  -1.001 
-0.034  -0.029  -0.031  -0.029  -0.028  -0.026 
Eigenvalues of   













The number of eigenvalues   
with a negative real part 
2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  2/4  4/4 
Satisfaction of the stability 
conditions 
×  ×  ×  ×  ×  ○ 
Satisfaction of the stability conditions: “○” if satisfied, “×” otherwise. 
 
   As is hardly different from the last case, it is necessary to reduce the ratio to 80% or less to 
restore the stability even under the 15% consumption tax rate. 
      We can continue these procedures but it would be infeasible to raise the consumption tax rate 
more than 15% due to political factors. Therefore, next we consider income taxes to increase 
government revenues. As discussed in Section 3-2, income taxes and inhabitant taxes can be 
estimated through an income tax function and an inhabitant tax function in our macroeconometric 
model. In these equations, the parameters are interpreted as the income elasticity of these taxes 
and are estimated as 1.17 and 1.29 each in fiscal year 2002 (see Appendix). Assuming that we can 
control the elasticity through, for example, abolition of the so-called permanent tax reduction in 
income taxes, taxation on public pension and so forth, we simulate these effects on the stability. In 
this simulation, we increase the elasticities of both taxes by increments of 0.001 each until the 
conditions are satisfied when the economy is unstable with the 15% consumption tax rate. Table 7 
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Table 7. The effect of the increase in income taxes and inhabitant taxes under the 15% consumption tax rate 
Outstanding amount   
of nominal net public debt   
(March 31, 2002; Ratio to nominal GDP) 
Actual value
(104%) 
100% 95% 90%  85% 
Increase in the elasticity of both income taxes 
(national tax) and inhabitant taxes on 
individuals (local tax) 
+0.033  +0.028  +0.020  +0.015  +0.010 
Estimated amount of tax increase 
(trillion yen) 
Approx.\8.3 Approx.\7.0 Approx.\4.7 Approx.\3.5 Approx.\2.2 
-0.996  -0.998  -0.998  -0.999  -1.001 











The number of eigenvalues   
with a negative real part 
4/4  4/4  4/4  4/4  4/4 
 
      In the actual situation at the end of fiscal year 2002, such that the net public debt / GDP ratio 
is equal to approximately 104%, we need a tax reform allowing the income elasticity of income 
taxes and inhabitant taxes on individuals to increase by 0.033 each, in addition to raising the 
consumption tax rate to 15%. With this tax reform, the estimated amount of tax income increase is 
8.3 trillion yen. This amount is much larger than each year reduction of 4.1 trillion yen in so-called 
permanent tax reduction that was initiated in fiscal year 1999, which means that we need a drastic 
fiscal reform including a tax increase to restore dynamic stability for the Japanese macroeconomy. 
   In the present study, we used the net debt / GDP ratio based on the BOJ’s “Flow of Funds 
Accounts” in fiscal year 2002. However, the value amounts to about 118% at the end of fiscal year 
2003 (166% for the gross debt / GDP ratio). Taking this figure into account, significantly more 
severe fiscal reform including tax increase would be essential for the economic stability of Japan. 
 
5.  Summary 
 
   W e  c o n s t r u c t e d  t h r e e  I S -LM type dynamic models to estimate the eigenvalues of their 
differential systems in order to confirm whether or not the huge amount of public debt violates the 
stability conditions for the Japanese economy. When the real parts of all eigenvalues are positive, 
the steady state is unstable and there are no grounds for the effectiveness of any policies based on 
the theory. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly estimates the 
coefficient matrix of the differential system, which is the distinguishing feature of this paper. 
      Under the assumption that the Japanese economy is at the steady state in fiscal year 2002, our 
estimation shows that the equilibrium is the saddle point, which is equivalent to unstable in our   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  73 
 
framework with no jumpable variables. Unless we decrease the BOJ’s “Flow of Funds 
Accounts”-based net debt / GDP ratio from about 104% to about 60% at the end of fiscal year 2002, 
we could not restore economic stability. Otherwise, a slight rise in the interest rates boosts public 
debt by increased interest payments, which swells public debt even further. It is expected that this 
cumbersome situation would be revealed with economic recovery; therefore, reduction in public 
debt could be the emergent policy issue for Japan’s economic stability. 
   We also consider tax policies to restore the economic stability. As explained, we could not 
decrease government spending for this purpose in the simulation since government expenditure is 
exogenous in the IS-LM type framework used here. Our estimation shows that we need a tax 
reform to raise the consumption tax rate to 15%, and in addition, allowing the income elasticities 
of income taxes and inhabitant taxes to increase by 0.033 each. This 0.033 rise in the income 
elasticities is equivalent to tax hikes of about 8.3 trillion yen. Given that revenues from income 
taxes and inhabitant taxes totaled about 23 trillion yen in fiscal year 2002, this tax reform must be 
severe. 
   Finally, we summarize the relationships with the relevant studies introduced in the first 
section. First, although some literature such as Blinder-Solow (1973) and Turnovsky (1977) 
stresses that the stability conditions of the IS-LM type dynamic model should be tested 
empirically, no such study has been conducted so far. Our first trial shows that the Japanese 
economy is unstable. Second, as is mentioned in Blinder-Solow (1973), the stability conditions are 
sufficient conditions for the sustainability of the government budget. Since the Japanese economy 
is unstable as we estimated, it would be quite difficult to sustain the budget deficit of the 
government. Therefore, we assert again that structural reform for the government budget including 
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Appendix. All Structural Equations of the Macroeconometric Model 
 
   This macroeconometric model is estimated mainly on the basis of three official statistical 
sources. Data for the goods and services markets is mainly from the  “Annual Report on National 
Accounts” (from fiscal year 1980 to 2002) by the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan). We obtained the financial data from the “Financial and 
Economic Statistics (from fiscal year 1980 to 2002)” and “Flow of Funds Accounts (from fiscal year 
1989 to 2002)”, which are compiled by the Bank of Japan. All of this macro data is based on 93SNA 
and the data frequency is annual. The sources for the other data that we used are as follows: 
 
“Annual Report on Population Estimates”, 
  (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) 
“Fiscal Statistics” (Ministry of Finance) 
“Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises”, 
(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office) 
“Labour Force Survey” (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) 
  “Monthly Finance Review” (Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance) 
“Monthly Labour Survey” (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) 
“Social Capital of Japan” (Cabinet Office)   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  75 
 
   It was necessary to estimate the equations using a small sample because of insufficient 
retroaction of 93SNA in Japan. Under this restriction, the two-stage least squares estimators and 
the three-stage least squares estimators are unreliable. Therefore, we simply employ OLS, 
although we recognize the problem of the simultaneous-equations bias. The only exception is the 
production function, which we estimated by the maximum likelihood method considering the 
first-order autocorrelation of the error term. 
 
[Note] 
1) “D_-_” in the equation denotes a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ in the corresponding period. For 
instance, “D91_94” is a dummy variable in which ‘1’ is taken from fiscal year 1991 to 1994. We 
express the fiscal year 2000 as “00”; similarly, fiscal year 2001 (2002) as “01(02)”. 
2)  “・”  (dot) on the variable denotes the rate of change from the previous year, while  “Δ”(delta) 
ahead of the variable denotes the amount of the change from the previous year. 
3) The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ‘ 
** ’ denotes coefficients significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level, and ‘ * ’ at the 10% level. 
4) The real value of each variable is standardized by the price level in 1995. 
5) The unit of the amount is "billion yen", the unit of the interest rate and that of the rate of change 
is "%", and the unit of the population is "10,000 persons". The price deflators are standardized so 
that the value in 1995 might become 1. 
6) Series that existed only in the calendar-year-base were converted into fiscal-year-based series 
using the following equation: 
   P s e u d o   f i s c a l -year-based value = 0.75  ×  the value of the present calendar year 




1. Real Aggregate Demand 
・Real gross domestic expenditure 
RY = RCP +RIH +RIP + RCG +RIG +RIF 
+RIN + (REX  – RIM) 
 
・Real private consumption expenditure 
FY1981–2002 













2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.03 
 
・Real private residential investment   
FY1981–2002 
RIH = –3770 
 [ -0.54] 
–2620×D84_85 –2720×D01_02 
[-3.13
**]        [ -2.92
**] 



















・Real private equipment investment 
  (Based on “Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises”) 
FY1981–2002 
RIP#  –δP×KP -1 
= 68900 +6010×D94 – 7420×D02 
 [8.85
**] [2.33
**]    [-2.59
**] 








– 4910×(RL +δP  – 
・
PI)  – 0.06×KP-1 
[-7.85
**]                  [ -7.20
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 9    D W   = 1.97 
 
・Real private equipment investment 
(Based on “Annual Report on National ccounts”) 
RIP = ADJ × RIP# 
 
・Real general government consumption 
RCG = MED / PCG + (RC_CG + RC_LG) 
 
・Real general government investment 
RIG = RI_CG + RI_LG 
 
・Real exports of goods and services 
FY1981–2002 
log(REX) = 4.38    +0.04×D00 – 0.08×D01 
 [15.8
**] [2.00
**]    [-4.33
**] 









2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.63 
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・Real imports of goods and services 
FY1980–2002 











+0.0013×D91_94 – 0.0005×D00_02) 
[-7.19
**]          [ 2 . 4 7
**] 
×ER×(PU / PY) 
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.02 
 
 
2. Real Aggregate Supply 
 
・Private sector, Real domestic product 
FY1982–2002 
log(RYP / LDP) =  –0.685 +0.01×TIME 






×log( (KP-1×CU) / LDP ) 
– 0.02×log(KG-1) +0.32×e-1 
[-0 . 2 9 ]             [ 1 . 6 5
*] 
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.84 
 
・General government, Real domestic product 
FY1983–2002 













・Private sector, Labor demand 
  [10000 persons * Working hours] 
LDP = ( (1-RU)×LS – LDG ) × LT 
 
・Rate of unemployment in labor force 
FY1985–2002 




– 0.05×D97  – 0.05×D00 
[-1.86
*]        [ -1.71
*] 







2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.71 
 




U  =  –0.04 
 [ -5.81
**] 
+0.05×( D89 +D94_95 
[8.86
**]      +D97  +D99  +D02) 




×YKE / PY 
 R
2(adj) =  0.96  DW  = 1.66 
* D(if __) denotes the dummy variable 
that takes ‘1’ if the condition in 
parentheses is satisfied. 
 
・Potential Gross Domestic Product (Real) 
 
SY = e 
-0.685 +0.01×TREND 
×( KP-1×CU
*  )  
(0.22+0.16×D82_89) 
×( (1-RU
*) ×LS ) 
(1- (0.22+0.16×D82_89) ) 
+ RYG 
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3. Real Capital Stock 
 
・Real private capital stock (equipment) 
KP = (1–δP)×KP-1 + RIP 
 
・Real housing stock 
KH = (1–δH)×KH-1 + RIH 
 
・Real social capital stock 
KG = (1–δG)×KG-1 + (RIG +RIF) 
 
4. GDP Deflator and Nominal GDP 
 
・GDP deflator 
PY = (1+RMP)× PTY 
 
・GDP deflator excluding consumption tax factor   
FY1990–2002 
log(PTY / PTY -1) 











2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.02 
 
・Nominal GDP 
NY = PY  × RY 
 
5．Nominal Aggregate Demand 
(Limited to the ones that are required when we 
consider the nominal balance of savings and 
investments of household, firm and government.) 
 
・Nominal private consumption expenditure 
NCP = RCP  × P CP 
・Nominal private residential investment 
NIH = RIH  × P IH 
 
・Nominal private equipment investment 
NIP = RIP  × P IP 
 
・Nominal inventory investment 
NIN = RIN  × P IN 
 
・Nominal general government consumption 
NCG = (RC_CG +RC_LG)×PCG + MED 
 
・Nominal general government investment 
NIG = (RI_CG +RI_LG)×PIG 
 
 
6. Deflator of each demand component 
(Limited to the ones that are required when we 
consider the nominal balance of savings and 
investments of household, firm and government.) 
 
・Deflator of private consumption expenditure 
PCP = (1+RMP)×PTCP 
 
・Deflator of private consumption expenditure 
excluding consumption tax factor 
FY1981–2002 











2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.77 
 
・Deflator of private residential investment 
PIH =  ( 1 + R M P ) ×PTIH   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  79 
 
・Deflator of private residential investment 
  excluding consumption tax factor 
FY1982–2002 
log(PTIH) = 0.008 
[2.26**] 
– 0.03×D85_86 – 0.02×D98 
[-4.01









2(adj) =  0.98  DW  = 2.36 
 
・Deflator of private equipment investment: 
Exogenous 
 
・Deflator of general government consumption 
PCG = (1+RMP)× PTCG 
 
・Deflator of general government consumption 
excluding consumption tax factor 
FY1981–2002 











2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.70 
 
・Deflator of inventory investment: Exogenous 
 





7. Distribution of Nominal GDP 
 
・National income 




CTX = –2840 
[-18.8
**] 
–2050×D97 +487×D98 +725×D99 
[-21.8
**]     [5.18
**]     [7.69
**] 




×RCTX  ×( NCP +NIH +NCG +NIG ) 
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.00 
 
・Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
FY1981–2002 





**]          [ 2 . 3 3
**] 
+0.06×YLE  +0.08×YKE 
[13.2
**]        [ 5 . 1 2
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0.97  DW  = 1.56 
 
・Subsidies 
SUB = SB_CG+SB_LG 
 
・Consumption of fixed capital 
CF = CF_H +CF_F +CF_CG +CF_LG +CF_O 
 
・Employee compensation 
YLE =  α×YD 
 
・Operating surplus of firm sector 
YKE = YD–YLE 80  K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review 
 
・Operating surplus 
(Share of the private unincorporated enterprises) 
YKE_H =  βH×YKE 
 
・Operating surplus 
(Share of the private corporations) 
YKE_F =  βF×YKE 
 
 
8. Tax Revenue of the Central Government 
 
・Central government, Tax revenue 
TAX_CG = HTX +FTX +DTX_CG +CPTX 
+CTX_CG +OTX_CG 
 
・Income tax (National taxes) 
FY1981–2002 




 –0.06×D99 +0.14×D00_01 
 [ -1 . 5 7 ]       [ 4 . 2 5
**] 
+(1.21  –0.02×D94_97 –0.03×D98_02) 
[21.4
**][-7.73
**]         [ -11.2
**] 
×log(YLE +YKE_H +RI_H –PI_H –PEN_C) 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 8     D W   = 1.79 
 
・Corporate tax (National taxes) 
FY1982–2002 





**]        [ -2.02
**] 
+(1.07 +0.02×D91_94 –0.02×D00_02) 
[12.0
**][6.83




2(adj) =  0 . 9 4     D W   = 1.92 
 
・Inheritance tax, donation tax (National taxes) 
(Including Land-value tax, FY1992–1997) 
FY1981–2002 
CPTX  ＝–849 
 [ -4.56
**] 
–578×D90 –791×D91 –258×D02 
[-2.89
**]   [-4.19









2(adj) =  0 . 9 6     D W   = 1.78 
 
・Central government, Other direct taxes 
DTX_CG =  νCG  × (ETX_H  +ETX_F) 
 
・Consumption tax 
(Share of the central government) 
CTX_CG =  γCG×CTX 
 
・Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
(Share of the central government) 
OTX_CG =  θCG×OTX 
 
 
9. Tax Revenue of the Local Government 
 
・Local government, Tax revenue 
TAX_LG = LHTX +LFTX +DTX_LG 
+CTX_LG +OTX_LG 
 
・Inhabitant tax on individuals (Local taxes) 
FY1982–2002 





**]    [-2.69
**]   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  81 
 




+YKE_H +RI_H –PI_H –PEN_C ) 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 8     D W   = 1.63 
 
・Inhabitant tax on corporations (Local taxes) 
FY1981–2002 
log(LFTX)  ＝–2.66 
 [ -2.73
**] 
+0.42×D89_91  –0.21×D02 
[9.65
**]         [ -3.08
**] 
+ (1.04+0.04×D92_95 +0.01×D00_02) 
[10.9
**][8.70
**]       [4.02
**] 
×log(YKE_F +RI_F –PI_F) 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 3    D W   = 2.60 
 
・Local government, Other direct taxes 
DTX_LG = (1–νCG)×(ETX_H +ETX_F) 
 
・Consumption tax 
(Share of the local government) 
CTX_LG = (1 –γCG)×CTX 
 
・Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
(Share of the local government) 
OTX_LG = (1 –θCG)×OTX 
 
 
10. Household: Disposable Income, 
Balance of Savings and Investment (Nominal) 
(Including Private Unincorporated Enterprises) 
 
・Household, Disposable income 
DI_H  ＝  (RI_H –PI_H) + (YLE +YKE_H) 
+(SGA_CG +SGA_LG) +PEN_S 
– (HTX +LHTX +ETX_H) 
– PEN_C – OFT_H 
・Household, Property (interest) income 
FY1989–2002 










**]      [7.52
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 9     D W   = 1.96 
 
・Household, Debt interest payment 
FY1992–2002 









2(adj) =  0 . 9 8     D W   = 1.80 
 
・Household, Social security contribution 
PEN_C =  η  ×YD 
 
・Household, Social security benefits 
FY1982–2002 








+10.8  ×POP65 +2270×RU 
 [6.52
**]          [ 7 . 0 3
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 9    D W   = 1.41 
 
・Household, Balance of savings and investment 
ISB_H = (DI_H +CF_H) 
– (NCP +NIH +NIP_H +OCT_H) –CPTX 
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・Consumption of fixed capital 
(Share of the household sector) 
CF_H / PIH = RC_H  ×KH95-1 
 
・Equipment investment by private   
unincorporated enterprises (Nominal) 
NIP_H =  χH  × NIP 
 
 
11. Private Corporations: Profit after Taxation, 
Balance of Savings and Investment (Nominal) 
 
・Private corporations, Profit after taxation 
DI_F  ＝  (RI_F – PI_F) +YKE_F 
– (FTX +LFTX +ETX_F) – OFT_F 
 
・Private corporations, Property income 
FY1992–2002 






**]      [2.24
**] 
+0.007×RB  +0.001×RB-1 
[8.61
**]        [ 2 . 1 1
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0.99    DW  = 1.75 
 
・Private corporations, Debt interest payment 
FY1990–2002 
PI_F / L_F-1 =  0.021  –0.006×D99_01 
[7.40





2(adj) =  0 . 9 6     D W   = 2.04 
 
・Private corporations,Balance of savings and investment 
ISB_F = (DI_F +CF_F) 
– (NIP_F +NIN_F +OCT_F) 
・Private corporations, Consumption of fixed capital 
(Share of the household sector) 
CF_F/PIP = RC_F  × KP95-1 
 
・Private corporations, Equipment investment   
(Nominal) 
NIP_F = (1–χH)  × NIP 
 
・Private corporations, Inventory investment   
(Nominal) 
NIN_F =  ξF  × NIN 
 
 
12. Fiscal Balance of the Central Government 
 
・Central government, Fiscal balance 
ISB_CG = (RI_CG –PI_CG) +TAX_CG 
– (LATG_G +SS_CG +SGA_CG +SB_CG) 
– (RC_CG×PCG +RI_CG×PIG +NIN_CG) 
+ CF_CG – OTH_CG 
 
・Central government, Debt interest payment 
FY1991–2002 










**]       [ 2 . 2 5
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0.99   DW  = 2.03 
 
・Central government, 
Financial Support toward Social Security Fund 
FY1981–2002 













2(adj) =  0.99   DW  = 1.41 
 
・Central government, 
Social assistance benefits toward household 
SGA_CG =  φCG  × YLE 
 
・Central government, Inventory investment   
(Nominal) 
NIN_CG =ξCG  × NIN 
 
 
13. Fiscal Balance of the Local Government 
 
・Local government, Fiscal balance 
ISB_LG = (RI_LG –PI_LG) +TAX_LG 
+LATG_G – (SGA_LG +SB_LG) 
– (RC_LG×PCG +RI_LG×PIG 
+NIN_LG) +CF_LG – OTH_LG 
 
・Local government, Debt interest payment 
FY1993–2002 









**]       [2.58
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0 . 9 8    D W   = 1.85 
 
・Local government, 
Social assistance benefits toward household 
SGA_LG =  φLG  × YLE 
 
・Local government, Inventory investment (Nominal) 
NIN_LG =ξLG  × NIN 
14. Financial Markets 
 
・Household, Gross financial liabilities (Nominal) 
L_H  ＝ LP_H+LG_H 
 
・Household, Debts from private sector (Nominal) 
FY1990–2002 




 +0.07×YLE  +0.28×YKE 
[ 1 . 5 0 ]        [ 2 . 6 8
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.92 
 
・Household, Net financial liabilities (Nominal) 
FY1993–2002 
ΔDAL_H = 10100 
[4.47
**] 
 –24600×D99 – 8380×D00_01 
[-3.21








2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.29 
 
・Household, Gross financial assets (Nominal) 
A_H  ＝ (LP_H+LG_H)+DAL_H 
 
・Household, Government bond holding (Nominal) 
FY1990–2002 
Δ(B_P / (A_H-1 + A_F-1 – POS_H-1) ) 
= 0.007×D97 –0.026×D01 
 [2.66
**]       [ -7.97
**] 







**]        [ -4.95
**] 
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.72 
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・Government bond issuance (Nominal) 
FY1990–2002 
ΔB_CG = +7790×D99_00 
[3.65
**] 




2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.55 
 
・Real government bond yield (Market equilibrium) 
( B_CG +B_FIL ) / PY    = ( B_P +B_OTH) / PY 
 
・Nominal government bond yield 




・Nominal interest rate of bank lending 
FY1981–2002 




+0.46×D98 + 0.19×RCA + 0.83×RB 
[3.06
**]      [ 5 . 8 7 * * ]       [ 1 9 . 0 * * ]  
R
2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 1.67 
 
・Outstanding government bonds (Real) 














・Central government, Net financial liabilities   
(Nominal) 
ND_CG = B_CG+D_CG 
 
･Central government, Gross financial liabilities   
(Nominal) 
GD_CG = ND_CG +A_CG 
 
・Local government, Net financial liabilities   
(Nominal) 
FY1991–2002 
ΔND_LG =  –962  –  6220×D97 – 5230×D00 
[-2.34
**] [-10.0
**]       [ -8.21
**] 




2(adj) =  0.99  DW  = 2.23 
 
・Local government, Gross financial liabilities   
(Nominal) 
GD_LG = ND_LG +A_LG 
 
・Net public debt (Nominal) 


















1. Real Aggregate Demand 
RY  Real gross domestic expenditure 
RCP  Real private consumption expenditure 
RIH  Real private residential investment 
RIP#  Real private equipment investment 
(Based on “Gross Capital Stock of Private 
Enterprises”) 
RIP  Real private equipment investment 
(Based on the “Annual Report on National 
Accounts”) 
RCG  Real general government consumption 
RIG  Real general government investment 
REX  Real exports of goods and services 
RIM  Real imports of goods and services 
 
2. Real Aggregate Supply 
RYP  Private sector, Real domestic product 
RYG  General government, Real domestic product 
LDP  Private sector, Labor demand 
[10000 persons * Working hours] 
RU  Rate of unemployment in labor force 
CU Capital  utilization  index 
SY  Potential gross domestic product (real) 
 
3. Real Capital Stock 
KP  Real private capital stock (equipment) 
KH  Real housing stock 
KG  Real social capital stock 
 
4. GDP Deflator and Nominal GDP 
PY GDP  deflator 
PTY  GDP deflator excluding consumption tax 
factor 
NY Nominal  GDP 
 
 
5. Nominal Aggregate Demand 
NCP  Nominal private consumption expenditure 
NIH  Nominal private residential investment 
NIP  Nominal private equipment investment 
NIN Nominal  inventory  investment 
NCG  Nominal general government consumption 
NIG  Nominal general government investment 
 
6. Deflator of Each Demand Component 
PCP  Deflator of private consumption expenditure 
PTCP  Deflator of private consumption expenditure   
excluding consumption tax factor 
PIH  Deflator of private residential investment 
PTIH  Deflator of private residential investment   
excluding consumption tax factor 
PCG  Deflator of general government consumption 
PTCG  Deflator of general government consumption   
excluding consumption tax factor 
 
7. Distribution of Nominal GDP 
YD National  income 
CTX Consumption  tax 
OTX  Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
SUB Subsidies 
CF  Consumption of fixed capital 
YLE Employee  compensation 
YKE  Operating surplus of firm sector 
YKE_H Operating surplus distributed to private   
unincorporated enterprises 
YKE_F  Operating surplus distributed to private   
corporations 
 
8. Tax Revenue of the Central (National) 
Government 
TAX_CG  Central government, Tax revenue 
HTX    Income tax (National taxes) 86  K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review 
 
FTX    Corporate tax (National taxes) 
CPTX   Inheritance tax, donation tax 
(National taxes) 
(Including land-value tax, FY1992–1997) 
DTX_CG  Central government, Other direct taxes 
CTX_CG Consumption  tax  
(Share of the central government) 
OTX_CG  Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
(Share of the central government) 
 
9. Tax Revenue of the Local Government 
TAX_LG  Local government, Tax revenue 
LHTX  Inhabitant tax on individuals (Local 
taxes) 
LFTX  Inhabitant tax on corporations (Local 
taxes) 
DTX_LG  Local government, Other direct taxes 
CTX_LG Consumption  tax 
(Share of the local government) 
OTX_LG  Indirect taxes excluding consumption tax 
(Share of the local government) 
 
10. Household: Disposable Income, 
Balance of Savings and Investment (Nominal) 
(Including Private Unincorporated Enterprises) 
 
DI_H    Household, Disposable income 
RI_H    Household, Property (interest) income 
PI_H    Household, Debt interest payment 
PEN_C  Household, Social security contribution 
PEN_S   Household, Social security benefits 
ISB_H  Household, Balance of savings and 
investment 
CF_H  Consumption of fixed capital   
(Share of the household sector) 
NIP_H   Equipment investment by private 
unincorporated enterprises (Nominal) 
 
11. Private Corporations: Profit after Taxation, 
Balance of Savings and Investment (Nominal) 
 
DI_F  Private corporations, Profit after taxation 
RI_F  Private corporations, Property income 
PI_F  Private corporations, Debt interest payment 
ISB_F Private corporations, Balance of Savings 
and Investment 
CF_F  Private corporations, Consumption of fixed 
capital (Share of the household sector) 
NIP_F  Private corporations, Equipment 
investment (Nominal) 
NIN_F Private corporations, Inventory 
investment (Nominal) 
 
12. Fiscal Balance of the Central Government 
ISB_CG  Central government, Fiscal balance 
PI_CG   Central government, Debt interest 
payment 
SS_CG   Central government, Financial 
support toward Social Security Fund 
SGA_CG  Central government, Social assistance 
benefits toward household 
NIN_CG  Central government, Inventory 
investment (Nominal) 
 
13. Fiscal Balance of the Local Government 
ISB_LG  Local government, Fiscal balance 
PI_LG   Local government, Debt interest payment 
SGA_LG  Local government, Social assistance 
benefits toward household 
NIN_LG Local  government,  Inventory 
investment (Nominal) 
 
14. Financial Markets 
L_H  Household, Gross financial liabilities 
(Nominal) 
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LP_H  Household, Debts from private sector 
(Nominal) 
DAL_H  Household, Net financial liabilities 
(Nominal) 
A_H  Household, Gross financial assets 
(Nominal) 
B_P  Household, Government bond holding 
(Nominal) 
B_CG Outstanding  government  bonds 
(Nominal) 
RRB  Real government bond yield 
RB  Nominal government bond yield 
RL  Nominal interest rate of bank lending 
RB_CG  Outstanding government bond (Real) 
ND_CG  Central government, Net financial 
liabilities (Nominal) 
GD_CG  Central government, Gross financial 
liabilities (Nominal) 
ND_LG Local  government,  Net  financial 
liabilities (Nominal) 
GD_LG  Local government, Gross financial 
liabilities (Nominal) 
ND_G   Net public debt (Nominal) 




A. Domestic Macroeconomy 
 
LDG  Government Sector, Employed persons 
LS Labor  force 
LT  Working hours (unit: hours/month) 
POP Nationwide  population 
POP65   Population 65 years old and older 
MED  Nationwide medical expenses (Nominal) 
LP  Index of urban land prices (FY2000 = 100) 
PS  Nikkei 225 Stock Average (Unit: yen) 
RISK  Loan loss risk index 
(Liabilities of bankruptcy enterprises / 
liabilities of corporate businesses) 
 
B. Foreign Macroeconomy 
PU  United States, GDP deflator 
ER  Nominal Exchange Rate ($/¥) 
USRY  United States, Real GDP (Unit: $billion) 
 
C. Potential Output 
CU*  Mean value of capacity utilization index in 
the 11th and the 12th business cycle 
RU* Structural  unemployment  rate 
(assumed as 2.5%) 
 
D. Capital Depletion Rate 
δP  Depletion rate of private capital stock 
δH  Depletion rate of private housing stock 
δG  Depletion rate of social capital stock 
 
E. Consumption of Fixed Capital 
RC_H    Household, Consumption rate of fixed 
capital 
RC_F  Private corporations, Consumption rate of 
fixed capital 
CF_CG  Central government, Consumption of 
fixed capital 
CF_LG   Local government, Consumption of fixed 
capital 
 
F. Aggregate Demand 
RIN Real  inventory  investment 
RIF  Real equipment investment by public 
corporations 
ADJ  Adjustment factor that we use to convert 
private equipment investment from  “Gross 
Capital Stock of Private Enterprises” basis 
to  “Annual Report on National Accounts” 
basis 
 
G. Deflators Regarded as Exogenous 
PIP  Deflator of private equipment investment 
PIN  Deflator of inventory investment 
PIG  Deflator of public investment 
PIM  Deflator of imports of goods and services 
RMP  Rate of price shift caused by consumption tax 
 
H. Ratio Related to Income Distribution 
α Labor  share 
βH  Share of operating surplus distributed to 
private unincorporated enterprises 
βF  Share of operating surplus distributed to 
private corporations 
 
I. Tax Revenue: Distribution Between the Central 
and Local Government 
 
νCG  Share of other direct taxes distributed to the 
central government 
γCG   Share of consumption tax distributed to the 
central government 
θCG  Share of other indirect taxes excluding   K. Kameda, M. Nakata / Public Policy Review  89 
 
consumption tax distributed to the central 
government 
 
J. Policy Variables 
RCTX   Consumption tax rate 
LATG_G  Distribution of local allocation tax 
RCA Call  rate 
RI_CG   Central government, Investment (Real) 
RI_LG   Local government, investment (Real) 
RC_CG  Central government, consumption (Real) 
RC_LG  Local government, consumption (Real) 
SB_CG   Central government, subsidies (Nominal) 
SB_LG   Local government, subsidies (Nominal) 
 
K. Private Sector: IS-Balance 
ETX_H  Household, Other direct taxes (Payable) 
OFT_H  Household, Other net current transfers 
(Payable) 
OCT_H  Household, Other net capital transfers 
(Payable) 
η  Household, Social security contribution as 
a percentage of national income 
χH   Share of private equipment investment 
occupied by private unincorporated 
enterprises 
ETX_F   Private corporations, Other direct taxes 
(Payable) 
OFT_F   Private corporations, Other net current 
transfers (Payable) 
OCT_F   Private corporations, Other net capital 
transfers (Payable) 
ξF  Share of inventory investment occupied by 
private corporations 
 
L. Governments: IS-Balance 
OTH_CG   Central government, Other net current 
and capital transfers (Payable) 
φCG  Central government, Ratio of social 
assistance benefit to employee 
compensation 
ξCG  Share of inventory investment occupied 
by the central government 
RI_LG  Local government, Interest payment 
OTH_LG  Local government, Other net current and 
capital transfers (Payable) 
φLG  Local government, Ratio of social 
assistance benefits to employee 
compensation 
ξLG  Share of inventory investment occupied 
by the local government 
 
M. Financial Market 
LG_H  Household, Debt from public sector 
POS_H   Outstanding amount of postal savings and 
postal life insurance 
B_FIL  Fiscal Loan Fund Special Account Bonds 
(A type of government bond) 
B_OTH  Other sectors, Government bond holding 
D_CG  Central government, Net debt other than 
government bonds 
A_F  Private corporations, Gross financial assets 
(Nominal) 
L_F  Private corporations, Gross financial 
liabilities (Nominal) 
A_CG  Central government, Gross financial assets 
(Nominal) 
A_LG  Central government, Gross financial assets 
(Nominal) 
 
N. Fluctuation of Present Market Value 
AJLP  Household, Fluctuation of present market 
value of debt from private sector 
AJBG  Central government, Fluctuation of present 
market value of government bonds 
AJLG  Local government, Fluctuation of present 
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